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I. INTRODUCTION
Discover Dance (Seattle). Mar 24, McCaw Hall at Seattle Center.
The most spectacular and beautiful series of performances by
prepubescent children I've witnessed! Admission was $10, but a
woman gave me an extra ticket she had. There were over 400 youth
participating, and most of them were girls. The show was approxi-
mately 2 hours, and included a 20 minute intermission-which was
an opportunity to mingle with LGs from the audience in the multi-
level lobby. GL-paradise!'
- Jack McClellan
t J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2009; B.A., Journalism, University of Montana,
2004. The author would like to thank Keith Seo and his editing team for their fantastic work.
Additionally, the author would like to recognize and thank Sarah Lysons for the time she spent
editing and reviewing this Comment. Special thanks to Seattle University's Editor in Chief, Jennifer
Smith, and Managing Editor, Jay Riffkin, for their friendship and support. Last, but not least, the
author would like to thank her family and friends for their unending love, encouragement, and
support.
1. See Archive of Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, http://web.archive.org/web/2007
0521043459/http://stegl.info (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl
Love]. The domain name Jack McClellan was originally using, http://stegl.info, is no longer regis-
tered to Jack McClellan. Currently, the domain name is being used, but the content has changed. It
appears, however, that Jack McClellan has purchased a new domain name. A domain name search
through whois.com reveals that a Jack McClellan in Portland, Oregon has purchased the domain
name of "PDXGL.info" and is registered with Joker.com. At the time of this publication, however,
this website had not been populated with any information. Because McClellan's website can no
longer be accessed, content cited in this Comment may be accessed through archived versions of the
website by using The Wayback Machine Internet Archive, which is available at http://www.archive.
org/web/web.php.
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Posted on the website of a self-proclaimed pedophile,2 blog entries
like this one shocked the nation and spurred two fathers into action. In
the summer of 2007,3 two attorneys with young children successfully
convinced a California judge to issue a restraining order and a permanent
injunction against Jack McClellan, the creator of the website, making it
nearly impossible for the 45-year-old to remain in the state.4 At the heart
of the controversy was McClellan's website, Los Angeles Girl Love,
which provided users with a database of local functions, parks, family
activities, and general locations to view "LGs" or little girls.5 The web-
site also displayed pictures McClellan had taken of children at various
local events.6 As upsetting as the website was, however, parents in
California were more shocked when they realized that Jack McClellan
had not violated any laws in posting pictures of their daughters online.7
Californians were not the first to deal with McClellan.8 Before
moving to California and starting Los Angeles Girl Love, McClellan
lived with his mother in Arlington, Washington, where he maintained
another website, Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love.9 McClellan was
effectively run out of Washington' when his website began generating
media attention, and his mother demanded that he leave her home." In
2. Beth Barrett & Barbara Correa, Wide-Ranging Order Granted Against Admitted Pedophile,
DAILY REV. (Hayward, Cal.), Aug. 4, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 15012595.
3. KATU Web Staff, Admitted Pedophile Heading Back to California, KATU (Portland, Or.),
Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.katu.com/news/local/11234356.html. McClellan left California for Port-
land, Oregon in the summer of 2007. Id. He said he chose Portland because of its reputation as a
haven for "offbeat people." Id.
4. Barrett & Correa, supra note 2. The restraining order, when first approved, prohibited
McClellan from being within thirty feet of any child. Id. McClellan himself said in interviews that
he was considering leaving California because the Santa Monica Police Department had posted his
photo online, and he had been threatened with violence. Id.
5. See Archive of Los Angeles Girl Love, http://web.archive.org/web/20070613111115/
http://stegl.info/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Los Angeles Girl Love]; see
generally discussion supra note 1.
6. Jennifer Steinhauer, Parents' Ire Grows at Pedophile's Unabashed Blog, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/28/us/28pedophile.html.
7. Id. Law enforcement from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department told reporters
they had no legal recourse against McClellan because he had done nothing illegal. Id. Some law
enforcement officials, however, remained skeptical about McClellan. Id. For example, Lieutenant
Thomas Sirkel from the Special Victims Unit of Los Angeles County was quoted as saying: "Has he
acted on it? I can't say. But I've been in business for 20 years, and I have never seen one who has
not." Id.
8. McClellan launched STEGL.info while living in Washington. Steinhauer, supra note 6.
9. KOMO Staff & News Servs., Former Washington Pedophile Launches Web Site in Port-
land, KOMO NEWS (Seattle, Wash.), Oct. 6, 2007, http://komotv.com/news/10279607.html.
McClellan's domain name, STEGL, stood for Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love. See Roe v.
McClellan, No. B203651, 2009 WL 94014, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2009).
10. KOMO Staff& News Servs., supra note 9. McClellan claims he left Washington because
of angry parents and the media attention he and his website had received. Id.
11. Id.
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June 2007, McClellan moved from western Washington to the Los
Angeles area and began attending local activities, looking for children,
and posting his findings and pictures on the Internet.12 Desperate to stop
McClellan from visiting and photographing family events, two commu-
nity members took action.
California attorneys Anthony Zinnanti and Richard Patterson filed
for a restraining order and a permanent injunction to stop McClellan. 3
Although McClellan's Internet service provider had already shut down
his website,14 Zinnanti and Patterson continued to pursue the restraining
order and the injunction, asking a judge to restrain McClellan from
"abhorrent" conduct after McClellan was spotted at a California bowling
alley.' 5 Taking the action one step further, the judge imposed a highly
restrictive restraining order that forbade McClellan from going within
thirty feet of any child within California.' 6  When Zinnanti learned that
McClellan was about to leave for Illinois, he raced to Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport and served the restraining order on McClellan himself.'7
Are parents left only with self-help when confronted with a self-
proclaimed pedophile photographing and chronicling innocent family
outings? 18  Is there no recourse in our justice system to combat these
12. See Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5.
13. Barrett & Correa, supra note 2; see also Roe, 2009 WL 94014, at *2 (describing restraining
order and permanent injunction filed against McClellan).
14. Steinhauer, supra note 6. The Internet server shut down McClellan's website in July 2007.
Id. McClellan was only offline for a few months; by early October he had created a new website in
Portland, Oregon. KOMO Staff& News Servs., supra note 9.
15. Barrett & Correa, supra note 2.
16. Id. The judge who issued the initial restraining order against McClellan, however, had to
revise the order a few weeks after it was initially entered. Beth Barrett, Judge Imposes 30-Foot
Buffer, Pedophile Ordered to Avoid Kids' Spots, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Aug. 25, 2007. The revised
restraining order and permanent injunction prohibited McClellan from
(1) harassing, attacking, threatening, assaulting (sexually or otherwise), hitting, follow-
ing, stalking, keeping under surveillance, blocking the movement, loitering, with or
around ... any minor child; (2) contacting (directly or indirectly), telephoning, sending
messages, mailing, emailing, photographing, videotaping, and otherwise or recording or
publishing any image of ... any minor child without the parent or guardian's written
consent; (3) taking any action, directly or through others, to obtain the addresses or loca-
tions of ... any ... minor child; (4) being within 10 yards of any place where children
congregate, including schools, playgrounds, and child care centers; and (5) loitering
where minor children congregate, including, but not limited to schools, parks, and play-
grounds.
Roe, 2009 WL 94014, at *3.
17. Barrett & Correa, supra note 2. Zinnanti learned that McClellan was leaving for Chicago
to tape a television appearance. Id. McClellan was escorted off of the American Airlines plane that
he had already boarded, served with the restraining order, and allowed to re-board. Id.
18. McClellan cited media reports and the resulting angry moms as the primary reasons why he
left Washington. KOMO Staff & News Servs., supra note 9.
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types of websites from the outset? Is there any way to stop these preda-
tors without subverting the First Amendment?
Parents should not be left to self-help remedies to combat websites
like Jack McClellan's. It is possible to limit the content of these websites
and to limit the use of innocuous photographs taken of unknowing
children without running afoul of the First Amendment. This problem
should be tackled on two fronts: state legislative action and federal
congressional action. At the state level, state legislators should regulate
the content of websites like McClellan's by borrowing from the legal
framework of California's Surrogate Stalker Act (SSA). 19 Enacting
statutes based on the SSA will give state prosecutors the tools to restrict
the content of these websites, posted with the intent to harm children. At
the national level, Congress should regulate the use of photographic
images on websites like McClellan's by redefining the term "sexually
explicit conduct" and by codifying a definition for "lascivious
exhibition" in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act), a federal statute
that criminalizes the distribution of certain images of children.2 °
Congress can regulate these pictures, without infringing on First
Amendment rights, by redefining "sexually explicit conduct" to include
innocuous yet sexually gratifying images.
Part II of this Comment explores the psychological make-up of a
pedophile by introducing the diagnostic criteria of pedophilia and
by examining lengths to which pedophiles will go to find children. This
Part also describes the danger created by websites with seemingly
innocuous images and writings, explaining how these websites enable
and validate pedophilia. Then, Parts III and IV tackle the issue on two
fronts, through state action and federal congressional action,
respectively. Part III describes and discusses the SSA, a recent addition
to the California Penal Code. In so doing, this Comment advocates that
other states consider similar measures. Part IV focuses on the need for
federal regulation of pictures like the ones posted on McClellan's web-
site. These Parts pose a solution that will limit what can be posted on
websites like McClellan's without running afoul of the First Amendment.
19. The Surrogate Stalker Act is a bill, introduced in California, that was signed into law in the
fall of 2008. Press Release, Cal. Assemb. Cameron Smyth, Assembly Smyth's Surrogate Stalker
Act Signed by Governor (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/member/
38/Default.aspx?p=pr [hereinafter Smyth Press Release].
20. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003, S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
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II. THE WEBSITE AND THE PEDOPHILE:
DANGERS OF ONLINE PEDOPHILIC GUIDES
To understand the need for state and federal regulation of websites
like McClellan's, a cursory examination of pedophilia is necessary. The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)
provides the diagnostic criteria for pedophilia:
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexu-
ally arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors including
sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (gen-
erally age 13 years or younger).
B. The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the sexual
urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal
difficulty.
C. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5 years older
than the child or children in Criterion A.2'
Pedophilic behavior typically begins at adolescence; however, some
pedophiles claim that their attraction to children did not begin until
middle age.22 Pedophiles may be attracted to either prepubescent girls
or prepubescent boys.23 The pedophile who acts on his24 sexual urges
toward children is likely to justify or rationalize his behavior by claiming
that sexual acts provide "educational value," that the child enjoyed the
experience, or that the child was promiscuous. 5
Another significant characteristic of pedophilia is deriving sexual
satisfaction from otherwise innocuous situations, publications, and
26places. For example, although child pornography is generally the
pedophile's first step toward illegal activity, 27 the pedophile can also gain
sexual gratification through more innocuous publications like department
store catalogs.28 Similarly, an otherwise benign visit to a department
store can also prove sexually gratifying: the pedophile may touch
21. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 302.2, at 572 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). All three criteria must be met for an affirmative
diagnosis ofpedophilia. Id
22. Id. at 571.
23. Id.
24. Because the vast majority of diagnosed pedophiles are men, this Comment will refer to the
pedophile as a "he." See MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST
CHILDREN: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION (2008).
25. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 21, at 571.
26. DUANE L. DOBBERT, HALTING THE SEXUAL PREDATOR AMONG US: PREVENTING ATTACK,
RAPE, AND LUST HOMICIDE 66 (2004).
27. Id. at 63.
28. Id. at 66.
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children's clothing and may even purchase the clothing to use later to
stimulate himself.
29
Given these basic traits found in individuals diagnosed with pedo-
philia, websites like Jack McClellan's enable and validate pedophilia in
two troublesome ways. First, the websites enable pedophilia by furnish-
ing sexually gratifying images and fostering the pedophile's perverse
search for gratification, telling the pedophile exactly where to go and
how likely he is to blend in.30 Second, the websites validate pedophilia
by serving as online forums and communities for the pedophile.
A. McClellan's Website Enables Pedophilia by Conveying Sexually
Gratifying Images and Suggesting Locations to Find Children
McClellan's website fuels the pedophile's desires and disease by
displaying innocuous images intended to produce sexual gratification.
At one point,31 the website contained pictures of girls in public places,
including pictures McClellan had taken at a dance recital in the Seattle
area.32 If a Sears catalog can prove sexually gratifying to a pedophile,33
it requires no stretch of the imagination to see how a picture of a child
taken at a family function and posted on McClellan's website can also
prove sexually gratifying. The exploitative nature of these pictures cre-
ates numerous concerns for families. Not only do the photographs "por-
tray ... children as being available to pedophiles, 34 they also
"establish the [photographed children] as victims of the sexual acts
promoted by McClellan. 35
Websites like McClellan's further exacerbate the mental health
problems the pedophile faces by making it easier for him to find new
places to discover potential victims. The pedophile will likely seek out
this type of information partly because of his obsessive nature.36 In a
series of prison interviews conducted by researchers, pedophiles admit-
29. Id. at 67.
30. Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5 (frequently mentioning the conspicuousness of an
unaccompanied male attending the events with children).
31. McClellan initially posted photographs of children on his website. Roe v. McClellan, No.
B203651, 2009 WL 94014, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2009). In July 2007, however, he removed
the pictures from the website and refrained from posting any other photographs. Steinhauer, supra
note 6.
32. Robert Shaffer & Dan Springer, Seattle-Area Pedophile Has 'How-to' Web Site for Men
Seeking Little Girl Activities, Fox NEWS, Mar. 30, 2007, http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,262700,
00.html.
33. DOBBERT, supra note 26, at 66.
34. Roe, 2009 WL 94014 at *6.
35. Id.
36. DOBBERT, supra note 26, at 69-70.
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ted that their lives were consumed by their perverse desires.37 They
explained that "their total state of consciousness" 38 was devoted to
thoughts of their potential victims. 39  This obsession could prove too
tempting to resist when fueled by McClellan's first-hand accounts
of family events. Because McClellan scouts and publishes several
locations, his website enables pedophiles to visit various locations to find
children. In particular, McClellan gives the pedophile an opportunity to
find an event or location that both the child and the pedophile commonly
enjoy frequenting, which increases the likelihood that the pedophile will
successfully find a victim.
40
Although the pedophile can search for children without websites
like McClellan's, these websites help facilitate the pedophile's search
while enabling him to remain anonymous. Pedophiles regularly seek out
new ways of drawing children into their confidences without raising
suspicions.41 Because the pedophile yearns for this degree of anonymity,
McClellan's website and others like it serve an invaluable function: the
pedophile learns not only where to find children but also how to attend
functions without raising suspicion as an unaccompanied man.42 With
McClellan acting as the canary in the coal mine, the pedophile
can avoid the risk of being exposed or getting caught. The website
allows the pedophile to follow McClellan's lead, going only where
unaccompanied men are less likely to be noticed.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 70.
39.Id.
40. Pedophiles strive to find activities both they and their potential child victims enjoy. See
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND PEDOPHILIA, S. REP. No. 99-537, at 8 (1986) (quoting DAVID SONENSCHIEN,
HOW TO HAVE SEX WITH KIDS 6-7 (1983)), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content storage_01/0000019b/80/2f/88/3f.pdf. An anonymous author
cited in David Sonenschien's booklet, How to Have Sex with Kids, suggested that
[t]he important thing about meeting kids is that it happens best when you meet in places
or in doing things that interest both of you. Like in video game arcades, kids can tell if
you're just there cruising for sex, or are there because you like playing the games. The
same with sports and sporting events. You can meet kids anywhere you go that you're
interested in going, and what's important about this is you've got a right to be where you
are.
Id.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5.
2009]
Seattle University Law Review
B. McClellan's Website Validates Pedophilia by
Creating Online Forums and Communities
Websites like McClellan's are also dangerous because they validate
the pedophile's desires.43 In a 1986 report on child pornography and
pedophilia prepared for the United States Senate, experts stated that
pedophiles seek justification: "A pedophile needs to know or to convince
himself that his obsession is not 'abnormal' and dirty, but is shared by
thousands of other intelligent, sensitive people." 44 McClellan's website
shows the pedophile that someone else shares his desire to observe
children,45 which, in turn, reinforces the pedophile's belief that "because
so many others engage in the same activity, it must not be as 'wrong' as
society believes. ' '46 This reinforcement can overcome the pedophile's
instinct for caution,47 convincing him to take more brazen steps when
attempting to locate children.
Furthermore, the websites serve as support groups for pedophiles.
As the report explains, organized groups of pedophiles are most
dangerous when they serve as support groups.48 The groups "justify[]
pedophilia in the minds of their members and reinforce[] within child
molesters a belief that society, not the pedophile, is misguided., 49 By
allowing public access through the Internet, the websites create online
communities of pedophiles trying to accomplish a common goal:
meeting children.
McClellan's website enables and validates pedophilic behavior and
potentially criminal conduct by creating online communities where
pedophiles share their beliefs, post pictures of children, and scout out
locations to find children. Accordingly, both state and federal legislators
must update current laws regarding Internet speech as they relate to
pro-pedophile websites containing how-to information and pictures. The
current legal framework was not enacted with pedophilia in mind, but it
can be reworked to recognize and curtail the dangers posed by websites
like McClellan's.
43. S. REP. No. 99-537, at 10.
44. Id.
45. By describing and ranking events where children can be observed, the website demon-
strates to the pedophile reading the website that at least one other person shares his desires. See Los
Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5. Because someone else posted the information and was so open
about his purpose, this can lead the pedophile to feel less ashamed of his behavior and start
rationalizing his perverse desires. Cf S. REP. No. 99-537, at 10.
46. S. REP. No. 99-537, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id.
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By retooling current laws, legislators in both state and federal
governments should narrow the loopholes that allow pedophiles to
sexually exploit children. First, at the state level, legislatures should
adopt their own version of the SSA to limit the content posted on these
websites. Second, at the national level, Congress should update the
definition of "sexually explicit" within the PROTECT Act to limit the
types of pictures posted on these websites.
III. LEGALLY CURTAILING THE CONTENT OF THE WEBSITE
THROUGH STATE LEGISLATION
McClellan's website has never been challenged as speech
unprotected by the First Amendment. However, given the psychological
make-up of the pedophile, coupled with the fact that children are the
intended victims, legislatures should be able to restrict the content
appearing on this type of website without encroaching on First Amend-
ment rights. States should pass measures similar to an act recently
passed in California that are aimed at curbing websites that allow
pedophiles to virtually stalk children over the Internet.
A. Understanding the Surrogate Stalker Act
A recent addition to the California Penal Code could be the answer
to limit the content on websites like McClellan's. California's Surrogate
Stalker Act5° not only gives prosecutors a tool to punish the creators with
imprisonment or fines, it also allows parents to seek a preliminary
injunction enjoining further publication of information regarding their
child.5
The SSA punishes
any person who publishes information describing or depicting a
child, the physical appearance of a child, the location of a child, or
locations where children may be found with the intent that another
person imminently use the information to commit a crime against a
child and the information is likely to aid in the imminent commis-
sion of a crime against a child, is guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one
year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by
both a fine and imprisonment.52
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273i (2009).
51. Id. § 273i(a)-(e).
52. Id. § 273i. "Publishes" is further defined in the SSA. Id. § 273i(b). Under the SSA,
"publishes" means "making the information available to another person through any medium,
including, but not limited to, the internet, the World Wide Web. or e-mail." Id. "Child" is also
2009]
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One of the statute's most important contributions is its definition of
information.53 Under the SSA, "information" includes not only textual
content but also images and photographs.54 This definition, therefore,
encompasses almost everything posted on websites like McClellan's. 55
Moreover, because the SSA's list of material that could constitute
"information" is non-exhaustive,56 the definition has a flexibility that
allows the SSA to adapt to advancements in technology.
In determining how to adopt this broad statutory language, state
legislatures should note two elements of this statute that serve both to
protect the general public from prosecution and to ensure the statute's
constitutionality: imminence and intent.
1. Imminence
The SSA contains an imminence requirement that directly
addresses the concern that any regulation of speech could potentially
infringe on a citizen's First Amendment rights.
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances. 57 Yet not all speech is protected.
In the seminal case Brandenburg v. Ohio,58 the Supreme Court
established a dividing line between speech that is protected by the First
Amendment and speech that is not. The appellant, a Ku Klux Klan
leader, had been convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute
after appearing in films shot at a Klan rally.59 The films captured the
appellant addressing the crowd, "'advocating' violence to effect
political change. 6°  Declaring the criminal syndicalism statute to be
unconstitutional, the Court created a distinction between "advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation" and "advocacy ... directed to
incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action.' 61 Although the latter
further defined in the SSA. Id. § 273i(c). Under the SSA, "child" means "a person who is 14 years
of age or younger." Id.
53. See id § 273i(d). Under the SSA, "information" includes "but is not limited to, an image,
film, filmstrip, photograph, negative, slide, photocopy, videotape, video laser disc, or any other
computer-generate image." Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
59. Jd. at 446.
60. Id at 447.
61. Id.
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does not enjoy First Amendment protection, the Court stated, the former
does. 62 Statutes aimed at criminalizing speech, therefore, must restrict
more than "mere advocacy ' 63 and instead must seek to restrict speech
that "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." 64
The SSA takes into account Brandenburg by requiring that the pub-
lished material be "likely to aid in the imminent commission of a crime
against a child. '' 65  This imminence requirement, which may initially
appear problematic, is actually pragmatic. At first, the requirement
might trouble prosecutors concerned about the difficulty of proving
imminence. For example, studies show that a pedophile may take a long
time to groom a child before attempting to engage the child sexually.66
Moreover, the medium through which the information is presented, a
website, could pose an obstacle to a showing of imminence. However,
the requirement is practical as it provides the constitutional crutch the
statute needs. Without the imminence requirement, the statute would
otherwise risk being over-inclusive, and therefore, unconstitutional.
Thus, the requirement complies with the holding in Brandenburg.
2. Intent
In addition to restraining speech only outside the bounds of First
Amendment protection under Brandenburg, the statute contains another
constitutional safeguard: intent.
Although in Brandenburg imminence provided the line dividing
constitutionally protected speech from the speech that enjoys no
protection, the dividing line in Rice v. Paladin Enterprise, Inc. was
intent.67 In Rice, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the
publisher of the how-to manual Hit Man.68 The manual detailed how to
be a successful professional killer and disseminated information about
finding clients, securing payment, committing murder, and disposing of
bodies.6 9 The plaintiff, a man whose relatives were brutally murdered,7°
alleged that the perpetrator had not only purchased Hit Man but also
62. Id.
63. Id. at 449.
64.Id. at 447.
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273i (2009).
66. ANNA C. SALTER, PREDATORS: PEDOPHILES, RAPISTS, AND OTHER SEX OFFENDERS 66
(2004).
67. Rice v. Paladin Publ'g, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 241.
69. Id. at 257-62.
70. Id. at 239. James Perry, the man convicted of the murders, strangled an eight-year-old
quadriplegic boy and shot the boy's mother and nurse through the eyes. Id.
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followed its instructions in committing the triple murder.71
The plaintiffs theory of liability against the defendant was that, by pub-
lishing the booklet, the defendant had aided and abetted the perpetrator in
committing the murders.
72
Remarkably, Paladin stipulated to a set of facts indicating
that, in marketing Hit Man, Paladin 'intended to attract and assist
criminals and would-be criminals who desire information and
instructions on how to commit crimes,'(intemal citation omitted)
but also that it 'intended and had knowledge' that Hit Man actually
'would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals
to plan and execute the crime of murder for hire.73
Confident in the protections afforded by the First Amendment, Paladin
argued that the First Amendment provided a complete defense for a
publisher accused of assisting another in the commission of criminal
acts.74
For the Fourth Circuit, however, the outcome turned on intent.75
According to the court, when a speaker intends for a third person to
act in a particular way, like aiding and abetting the commission of a
crime, the imminence requirement of Brandenburg is no longer
applicable.76 Culpability in the aiding and abetting arena is premised not
on mere advocacy of criminal conduct but "on the defendants' successful
efforts to assist others by detailing to them the means of accomplishing
the crimes. 77  Although the First Amendment protects speech that
creates the mere foreseeability that the speech may be used to commit a
crime, it does "not relieve from liability those who would, for profit or
other motive, intentionally assist and encourage crime. 78  With this
framework in mind, the court reversed a lower court's ruling which
relieved Paladin from liability and remanded the case for trial.79
The court's holding in Rice gives legal backbone to the idea that
criminal how-to manuals, although not directed at any one individual,
could still fall outside the scope of the First Amendment.
The SSA embraces the theories set forth in Rice by including an
"intent" element. By requiring that the alleged perpetrator have "intent
that another person imminently use the information to commit a crime
7 1.Id. at 239-41.
72. Id. at 241.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 248.
76. Id. at 246.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 247-48.
79. Id. at 267.
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against a child," the SSA ensures that the perpetrator would be going
beyond mere advocacy and would instead be "intentionally assist[ing]
and encourag[ing] crime., 80 Furthermore, based on the Rice rationale,
proving this intent would not require the prosecution to show that the
speaker targeted his message to a specific individual. As the Rice court
stated, "the First Amendment [does not] insulate[] that speaker from
responsibility for his actions simply because he may have disseminated
his message to a wide audience., 81 Therefore, proving intent is not
necessarily undermined by the fact that the speech in websites
like McClellan's appears on the Internet and is available to everyone. As
long as the prosecution can satisfy this intent requirement, the
speaker cannot "shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First
Amendment.,
82
B. Applying the Surrogate Stalker Act
Because the SSA has been in effect since only January 1, 2009,83 its
scope and success has yet to be seen. Nevertheless, one could reasonably
assume that McClellan's website could have fallen under the statute's
purview. To challenge McClellan's website under the SSA, a prosecutor
would have to first show that while maintaining his website, McClellan
intended that the information he posted be used to commit a crime
against a child; and second, that information on the website could aid in
the imminent commission of said crime. Given proper factual support,
McClellan's website and others like it could meet the three elements-
publication, intent, and imminence-required by the SSA, and
thus trigger the statute's penal remedies.
The SSA requires that a person publish information describing a
child, the location where a child may be, or locations generally where
children can be found.84 The very reason McClellan's website came to
the attention of the national media was because it published locations
where children could be found. For example, in June 2007, McClellan
suggested the Santa Clarita Lanes Bowling Alley, the Atwater Street
Festival in Los Angeles, and the Downtown Burbank Fine Arts Festival
as places to see LGs.85 In addition, McClellan rated each location on a
scale of zero to five hearts based on how many LGs were present.86 A
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273i(a) (2009).
81. Rice, 128 F.3d at 248.
82. Id.
83. Smyth Press Release, supra note 19.
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273i(a).
85. See Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5.
86. See id.
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state prosecutor using this statute could show that McClellan meets the
first element. The next two elements, however, could be more challeng-
ing to establish.
The SSA also requires that the publisher intend that another person
use the information to commit a crime. 87 McClellan included the follow-
ing sentence underneath the titles of his Girl Love websites: "The
primary purpose of this site is to promote association, friendship; and
legal, non-sexual, consensual touch (hugging, cuddling, etc) between
men and prepubescent girls." 88  Although this disclaimer appears to
swing the intent element in McClellan's favor, other aspects of
McClellan's website show how a prosecutor could prove intent and
expose the disclaimer as nothing more than an illusory statement.
McClellan's claim that his website is only intended to be used for
legal purposes is contradicted by McClellan himself. For instance, the
website is directed to pedophiles with the title of the website using
the word "pedophilia." 89 Within several words of this reference to pedo-
philia, McClellan advocates the "consensual touch[ing] ... between men
and prepubescent girls." 90  McClellan, a self-proclaimed pedophile,91
should know that consensual touching can prove sexually gratifying
for a pedophile.92 In an interview, McClellan addressed this notion and a
pedophile's desire to touch children by saying: "I know it sounds kind of
crazy, but there's kind of a code of ethics that these pedophiles have
developed and that is ... the contact has to be completely consensual,
no coercion, if you're going to do it. ' ' 93  On his website, McClellan
professed his belief that children are capable of making consensual
decisions regarding sex. For example, after he indicated that the children
on the game show Are You Smarter than a Fifth Grader? are attractive,94
McClellan stated the show "demonstrates how intelligent kids that age
are ... [,] yet we are suppose to believe the anti-pedo line that they're not
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273i(a).
88. See Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, supra note 1; Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5;
Archive of Portland Girl Love, http://web.archive.org/web/20071027090508/http://www.stegl.info/
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Portland Girl Love]. For a general discussion of the status of
McClellan's website, see supra note 1.
89. See Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, supra note 1; Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5;
Portland Girl Love, supra note 88. Under the title of each website, McClellan uses the phrase "Girl-
oriented pedophilia."
90. See Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, supra note 1; Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5;
Portland Girl Love, supra note 88.
9 1. See Barrett & Correa, supra note 2.
92. See, e.g., DOBBERT, supra note 26, at 67. Pedophiles have been known to gain sexual
gratification from touching children's clothing. Id.
93. Shaffer & Springer, supra note 32.
94. See Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, supra note 1; Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5;
Portland Girl Love, supra note 88.
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smart enough to understand sex? ' 95 McClellan also openly questioned
the arrest of a man accused of having a "consensual sexual
relationship" with a thirteen-year-old girl: "[W]e are suppose to
consider him a 'pedophile rapist' ...."96 A prosecutor could utilize
these facts to argue that McClellan uses his website to tell his intended
audience (other pedophiles) that consensual touching is permissible;
children are capable of making decisions regarding sex; and,
accordingly, consensual sexual relations between young girls and grown
men are also permissible. A prosecutor could then point out that
McClellan uses the website for the explicit purpose of providing his
users (other pedophiles) with the necessary tools to meet children.9 7
Although McClellan has not openly acknowledged that he intends for
men visiting his website to engage in sexual conduct with young girls, a
prosecutor could potentially gather enough evidence from the website
itself for a jury to infer that this alarming intention lies in wait just below
the surface.
The statute's final element-that the published information aid in
the imminent commission of a crime against a child98-- could also prove
difficult, but not impossible for a prosecutor to meet. A pre-trial ruling
in a Massachusetts case involving a similar website suggests that the
mere fact that information appears on a website does not foreclose the
possibility that the information could incite imminent lawlessness. 99 A
prosecutor compiling evidence to support this element could focus on the
frequency of McClellan's postings, along with the activities and
events McClellan covered, to show that a pedophile could immediately
use the information to commit a crime. For example, McClellan sug-
95. See Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, supra note 1.
96. See id
97. See Seattle-Tacoma-Everett Girl Love, supra note 1; Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5;
Portland-Girl Love, supra note 88.
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273i(a) (2009).
99. Curley v. N. Am. Man Boy Love Ass'n, No. 00-CV-10956-GAO, 2001 WL 1822730, at *1
(D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2001). In Curley, the parents often-year-old Jeffery Curley, who had been sexu-
ally assaulted and killed by two men, brought a wrongful death against suit the North American Man
Boy Love Association ("NAMBLA"). Id. The lawsuit revolved around the allegation that
NAMBLA's advocacy and promotion of pedophilia in its publications and websites was the direct
and proximate cause of the murder of Jeffery Curley. See Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
31, Curley v. N. Am. Man Boy Love Ass'n, No. 00-CV-10956-GAO (D. Mass. May 16, 2000).
The defendants in Curley, represented by the ACLU, argued that the complaint filed by Jeffrey
Curley's parents had to be dismissed because the material posted on the NAMBLA website was
protected speech. Curley, 2001 WL 1822730, at * 1. The Curley court, however, refused to dismiss
the case due to the lack of information and lack of evidence amassed by the plaintiffs at the
preliminary stage of litigation. Id. at *2. The court explained: "What the plaintiffs can ultimately
prove will be seen, but for the time being, it is not clear that the Brandenburg doctrine would
foreclose liability on any set of facts that might be shown." Id.
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gests particular places a pedophile could visit to see LGs, such as the
Santa Clarita Bowling Alley.100 Because bowling alleys are open for
normal business hours, a website user could visit the establishment to
find a child victim soon after reading the venue's description on the site.
Consider also the Salute to Recreation Family Festival in Northridge,
Los Angeles. McClellan rated the event with five hearts on June 2,
2007; he then told his readers that the event lasted for three days.' 0' A
user could read McClellan's post and, soon after, attend the Salute to
Recreation Family Festival with the intention of committing a crime.
In targeting the text of these websites, the SSA will be effective.
The statute allows prosecutors to take affirmative steps to stop this type
of publication without waiting for molestation to actually occur.1
0 2
Because the SSA requires both intent and imminence, the statute
embraces both Brandenburg and Rice. Even if prosecutors were unable
to charge and convict McClellan under this statute, the option to
prosecute others who do fall under its purview would remain viable.
This statute, however, is not the only means by which websites like
McClellan's can and should be restricted.
IV. LEGALLY CURTAILING THE CONTENT OF THE WEBSITE
THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
While state legislatures should consider and adopt provisions
similar to the SSA, Congress should also work to provide a solution at
the national level. Specifically, Congress should target pictures, which
are among the most troubling parts of McClellan's website and others
like it.' °3
McClellan took pictures of children at the events he attended and
posted the images on his website.10 4  While parents were outraged,
McClellan justified this activity as a hobby:'0 5
It makes me happy simply. Like I said, I think girls are cute, beauti-
ful, just children in general make me happy ... being around lots of
them ... I'm doing what anyone else would do with a hobby.
100. See Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5.
101. See id
102. It also potentially deters pedophiles like McClellan from starting new websites.
103. Steinhauer, supra note 6. McClellan initially posted images of children on his website.
Id. By July 2007, however, McClellan stopped posting such pictures. Id.
104. Shaffer & Springer, supra note 32. A mother, whose eight-year-old daughter was photo-
graphed at a dance recital, discovered a picture that had been placed on the website. Id. The mother
was outraged, saying: "I didn't want the pedophile community having any visibility to my daughter
or her friends or any of the children that were on that site." Id.
105. Id.
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If someone's into birds they're taking pictures of birds. I'm
convinced that none of these images are illegal. °6
Unfortunately, McClellan was correct: none of his pictures were
illegal. 
107
McClellan claimed that the purpose of the pictures was to promote
pedophilia and direct other pedophiles to events and places where chil-
dren could be seen.' 0 8  Because pedophiles use otherwise innocuous
images of children for sexual gratification,'0 9 these pictures would likely
be used to fulfill sexual desires. Although some parents viewed these
pictures as creating the potential for a "physical threat," like abduction, 10
the real threat is probably more abstract: instead of kidnapping, these
pictures lead to the exploitation of children whose images are used to
sexually gratify grown men. Because sexual exploitation is the principal
reason why traditional images depicting child pornography are illegal,'
these images should likewise be regulated.
Congress should extend the definition of "sexually explicit
conduct" to capture these ostensibly innocuous images when a person,
such as McClellan, places them on a website intended to advertise
children to pedophiles. As discussed in Part III, the intent of the person
posting, selling, or trading the images is the dividing line. More specifi-
cally, the dividing line for determining whether an image displays
''sexually explicit conduct" should be whether the poster intends for the
pictures to be viewed in a sexually gratifying manner as well as whether
the image is otherwise obscene.
This Part explores the history behind federal regulation of child
pornography and how, despite this regulation, innocuous images fall
through the statutory cracks. Although these pictures are used for sexual
gratification, there is currently no mechanism to stop their distribution.
This does not have to be the case. Congress can successfully regulate
these images by expanding the definition of "sexually explicit conduct"
in the PROTECT Act so that innocuous images fall under its purview.
106. Id.
107. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
108. McClellan stated the purpose of his website was "to promote association, friendship; and
legal, nonsexual, consensual touch (hugging, cuddling, etc) between men and prepubescent girls."
Los Angeles Girl Love, supra note 5. In an article about MqClellan, it was further asserted that his
purpose was "to give [pedophiles] relief, by going out and being around little girls." Shaffer &
Springer, supra note 32.
109. DOBBERT, supra note 26, at 66. Pedophiles have been known to receive sexual gratifica-
tion by looking through department store catalogs. Id.; see also discussion supra Part 11.
110. Shaffer & Springer, supra note 32.
111. In holding that child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court reasoned that abuse and exploitation of children outweighed free speech considerations. New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
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At the same time, Congress should anchor this expanded definition to a
codified version of a judicial test that determines whether a picture
contains a "lascivious exhibition" of a child."
2
A. History Behind the Federal Regulation of Child Pornography
Adopted in 2003, the PROTECT Act" 3 is Congress's latest attempt
to criminalize the creating, pandering, and possessing of child pornogra-
phy.114 But it was not Congress's first attempt. The regulation of child
pornography has been in flux since the very first congressional statute
criminalizing it was passed over thirty years ago.]15
The idea that the First Amendment does not extend its protection to
child pornography is rooted in Miller v. California.116  In Miller, the
Supreme Court reviewed an appellant's conviction under California's
obscenity statute after he disseminated brochures that advertised books
containing "adult material." 117 To determine the extent to which a state
could regulate obscene material without violating the First Amend-
ment,' 1 8 the Court established a three-part test-the obscenity doctrine.'19
The obscenity doctrine requires the fact-finder to determine (1) whether
"the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(3) whether the work, taken as whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 20 The crux of the doctrine is a social merit
requirement that the material in question be viewed through the lens of
the community in which the material was circulated.'
2
'
112. See United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
113. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
114. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2006) (explaining evolution of
the PROTECT Act). The PROTECT Act is now codified and can be found scattered throughout
Title 18 of the United States Code. The specific sections discussed in this Comment can be found at
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) and § 2256(1).
115. The Child Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254, 2256, 2516 (2003).
116. See Williams, 444 F.3d at 1290.
117. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16, 18 (1973).
118. Id. at20.
119. Id. at 24 (holding that a state statute restricting speech must be limited "to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value"). The Court had already "categorically settled" that obscene material was not
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 23.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Shortly after the Miller decision, Congress passed its first piece
of legislation outlawing child pornography. 122 Codifying the obscenity
doctrine 123 in the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation
Act, 124 Congress outlawed the use of children in creating and distributing
obscene material.
125
Nine years after Miller and five years after passing the Protection of
Children against Sexual Exploitation Act, a unanimous Supreme Court
declared that child pornography was not protected speech under the First
Amendment. 126 In New York v. Ferber, the Court held that the need to
protect children against exploitation and sexual assault surpassed consti-
tutional considerations.2 7 The Court noted that its holding in Miller did
not go far enough to protect children from exploitation because the
obscenity doctrine "[bore] no connection to the issue of whether a child
[had] been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work.' 2 Thus, the test for child pornography was separate from the
obscenity doctrine in Miller.'29 The Court explained that, when address-
ing the issue of child pornography, the "trier of fact need not find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive
manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole."' 3 °
Shortly after Ferber, Congress again took action. In 1984, follow-
ing the lead from the Supreme Court, Congress passed the
Child Protection Act (CPA), 13 1 which expanded the definition of child
pornography. 32  Under the CPA, child pornography included non-
obscene yet sexually suggestive pictures of children. 33 The CPA also
122. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11 th Cir. 2006).
123. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
124. The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423, 2251-
2253 (1978).
125. Id.
126. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). At issue in Ferber was a New York
State statute aimed at outlawing child pornography. Id. at 749. The statute provided: "[A] person is
guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content
thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child
less than sixteen years of age."
127. Id. at 756-57. Specifically, the Court noted that it had previously "sustained legislation
aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have
operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 757.
128. Id. at 761.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The Child Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254, 2256, 2516 (1984).
132. See United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1291 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
133. Id.
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eliminated the requirement that the pictures be used for commercial
purposes.134 This new definition, however, did not last long.
With the advent of new photographic and computer-imaging
technology, law enforcement began to see a surge of virtual child
pornography: computer-generated images that were "virtually indistin-
guishable from images of actual children engaging in such conduct."'
135
Yet, the CPA's definition of child pornography failed to address
virtual children. 136 In response, Congress enacted the Child Pornography
Prevention Act (CPPA), amending the definition of child pornography
to include any image that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.' 37  The new definition also included any
material promoted in a manner that "convey[ed] the impression that a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct is depicted."'
' 38
This definition did not last long either. In 2002, the Supreme Court
declared it unconstitutional in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. 39 The
Court held that the CPPA's definition of child pornography was
unconstitutionally overboard because it went beyond the scope of Miller
and Ferber. 40 By proscribing images that were not necessarily offensive
in obvious ways, the CPPA offended Miller. The definition of child
pornography had come to include essentially all images of teenagers
involved in sexual activity regardless of their redeeming social value. 14 1
As the Court stated, "a number of acclaimed movies, filmed without any
child actors, explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohi-
bitions.'142 The Court recognized that teenage sexuality "is a fact of
modem society and has been a theme in art and literature for
centuries."1
43
Similarly, the CPPA went beyond Ferber by proscribing images
whether or not they involved children. 44 The Court held that because
child pornography constitutes a record of child abuse and that its traffick-
ing generates more child pornography, the state had a reasonable basis to
shut down the network.145  Because the CPPA's definition included
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1293.
136. Id. at 1292.
137. Id. at 1291 (quoting the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(B) (1996) (invalidated 2002; amended 2003)).
138. Jd.
139. 535 U.S. 234, 234 (2002).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 235.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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images that did not involve children at all, however, the Ferber rationale
could not lend its justification to the CPPA. 146
After the Ferber decision, Congress went back to work. Less than
a year later, Congress unveiled its solution in the form of the Prosecuto-
rial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act. 147 The effect of the PROTECT Act is twofold. First, the Act
includes a new pandering provision that outlaws the distribution, among
other things, of minors engaging in "sexually explicit conduct." 148 Sec-
ond, the Act includes a revised definition of child pornography.1 49  Of
particular importance to websites like McClellan's is the Act's pandering
provision. This provision punishes any person who knowingly
[a]dvertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the
mail, or in interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer,
any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the
belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the
material or purported material is, or contains ... an obscene visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or... a
visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. 150
The PROTECT Act defines sexually explicit conduct to be actual or
simulated
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-
genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex;
(ii) bestiality;
(iii) masturbation;
(iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
146. Id. at 236.
147. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11 th Cir. 2006).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2003).
149. Id. § 2256(8). The PROTECT Act redefined child pornography to include
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechani-
cal, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct where (A) the production of such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B) such
visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is,
or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C)
such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable
minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. This definition is beyond the scope of this Comment, which instead discusses the term "sexually
explicit" and its definition. See infra Part IV.B.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
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(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person. 1 51
These sections of the PROTECT Act have recently been declared consti-
tutional by the Supreme Court.
52
Unfortunately, the PROTECT Act does not go far enough and is
altogether insufficient to combat websites like McClellan's. The Act's
definition of sexually explicit does not capture innocuous pictures of
children that may be sexually gratifying to pedophiles. 153 As a result, the
Act allows pedophiles to capture, trade, and collect pictures of children
that are seemingly innocuous but are treated by pedophiles as sexually
gratifying material. For the same reasons that Ferber banned explicit
child pornography-concerns relating to sexual assault and the exploita-
tion of children-so too should these seemingly innocuous images be
banned. Banning these photographs can be accomplished within the
confines of Miller, so long as the intent of the poster is an integral con-
sideration. By expanding the definition of sexually explicit, Congress
can restrict the use of seemingly innocuous pictures used for a sexual
end.
B. The Solution:
Expanding the Definition of Sexually Explicit Conduct
Under the PROTECT Act, an individual may face criminal
sanctions if he "advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits"'
' 54
sexually explicit images of children. 155  To bring innocuous images
within the Act's reach, Congress must expand the current definition of
sexually explicit conduct. This expansion does not come without restric-
tions. Congress should keep the expanded definition of sexually explicit
conduct anchored by codifying a revised Dost test and the Miller
standard of obscenity.
First, Congress should revise § 2256(2)(A), which defines sexually
explicit conduct. More specifically, Congress should revise subsection
(v), which currently states that sexually explicit includes "lascivious
exhibition of genitals or pubic area of any person."' 56 The subsection
should instead provide that sexually explicit conduct includes a
151.Id. § 2256(2)(A).
152. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1848 (2008).
153. The current definition of "sexually explicit" would not capture innocuous images because
the definition requires the image display some form of conduct which, judged by most standards,
would be offensive. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 2256(2)(A)(v).
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lascivious exhibition of any person. This change will expand the scope
of what constitutes sexually explicit. No longer must an image display
the genitals or pubic area of a child to be regulated; a lascivious
image would suffice. To prevent potential exhibitions of children that,
although arguably lascivious, may have redeeming social value... from
falling under this definition, Congress should also adopt a codified defi-
nition of lascivious exhibition.
In determining what constitutes a lascivious exhibition, 158 many
courts have adopted the so-called Dost test. 59  In United States v.
Dost,160 the court identified the following six factors to determine
whether a picture contains a lascivious exhibition of a child:
(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's
genitalia or pubic area;
(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive,
i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;
(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappro-
priate attire, considering the age of the child;
(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
(5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a will-
ingness to engage in sexual activity; and
(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a
sexual response in the viewer.161
These six factors should be retained and codified but with one ex-
ception and one addition. First, these factors should be separated by the
word "or." Second, for an image to be deemed a lascivious exhibition,
the prosecutor must also show that the Miller standard for obscenity is
met. To that end, the revised definition would provide:
For purposes of § 2256(2)(A), lascivious exhibition is defined to be
(1) an image of a child
(a) that focuses on a child's genitalia or pubic area;
157. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 235 (2002).
158. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11 th Cir. 2006). Ifa prosecutor wants to
pursue a case under the expanded definition of "sexually explicit conduct," he or she must first show
that the image in question meets a codified definition of "lascivious exhibit."
159. See id.
160. 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affd sub nom, United States v. Weigand, 812
F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987).
161. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, and a picture need not include all six factors to be
viewed a "lascivious exhibition." Id.
2009]
Seattle University Law Review
(b) that shows the child in a setting that is sexually sugges-
tive or in a place or pose generally associated with sexual
activity;
(c) that shows the child in an unnatural pose, or in inappro-
priate attire, considering the age of the child;
(d) that shows the child fully or partially clothed, or nude;
(e) that suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage
in sexual activity; or
(f) that is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in
the viewer; and
(2) when judged as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, is
patently offensive in light of community standards, and lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
In effect, under this revised Dost test, each one of the alternatives
would meet the definition of lascivious exhibition. This test would have
the effect of capturing innocuous images of children intended to fulfill
sexual desires. Because alternative (1)(f) focuses on the intent of the
poster-as required under Rice-and element (2) includes the obscenity
doctrine-as required under Miller-this revised test should withstand
constitutionally scrutiny.
C. The Revised Dost Test
1. A Proposed Intent Analysis
Prosecutors invoking the proposed alternative (1)(f) to attack an
otherwise innocuous image of a child must show the defendant's intent.
If Congress codifies this revised Dost test, it should consider including
additional guidance, either in a definition or in the legislative history, on
which aspects of the defendant's relationship with the images suggest
wrongful intent. Providing examples, factors, or illustrations would help
ensure that a codification of the test withstands judicial scrutiny and
would help prevent regulation of images with redeeming social value.
First, intent could be shown by examining how the defendant refers
to the image. In United States v. Knox, a defendant labeled a video tape
of two young girls as "13-year[-]old flashes" and "hot."' 162 Although the
images seemed innocuous,163 the label suggested the intended use of the
pictures was to elicit a sexual response.
162.32 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1994).
163. The defendant in Knox had taken pictures of teenage and pre-teen girls engaging in baton
twirling and gymnastic routines. Id.
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Second, the location of and circumstances surrounding the trading
of the images could also supply evidence of intent. For example, in
United States v. Williams, the defendant was offering pictures of his
daughters in a chat room while using a sexually graphic screen name. 164
The defendant posted a message to the chat room stating: "Dad of toddler
has 'good' pics of her an[d] men for swap of your toddler pics, or live
cam."' 165 Given the defendant's sexually explicit screen name, the use of
the word 'good,' and the fact that he was soliciting a trade, the court
determined that he intended the pictures to be viewed as sexually ex-
plicit, even though the pictures were seemingly innocuous. 166
Third, how the defendant personally uses the pictures before
he posts them could show whether the image was intended to elicit a
sexual response in the viewer. For example, in an unpublished case from
Tennessee, a court held that a video tape of two young girls innocently
taking a bath constituted "sexual activity" under a state statute that pro-
hibited the distribution of such images of children: the court noted that
the defendant viewed the tape before engaging in sexual relations with
his girlfriend.
167
Other factors that could show intent include (4) the exchanging of
photographs for a disproportionate amount of money considering the
quality of the picture;' 68 (5) how the poster and the end-user know each
other; (6) the type of website the picture was posted on; and (7) other
material also available on the website where the picture is found.
If Congress chose to add language providing guidance on showing
intent, it should make clear that any list of factors is not exhaustive and
that each picture must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
2. Additional Constitutional Considerations
In addition to incorporating the intent requirement under Rice, the
revised Dost test takes into account the standards set forth in Miller and
Ferber. Therefore, unlike the CPPA, which the Court rejected for violat-
ing the Miller and Ferber standards, the revised Dost test should with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
164. 444 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11 th Cir. 2006).
165. Id.
166. Id. The pictures that were traded showed a toddler on the couch in a bathing suit and
several photographs of another toddler in non-sexual poses. Id.
167. State v. Dixon, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00085, 1998 WL 712344, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Oct. 13, 1998).
168. This would indicate that there was a monetary value attached to the picture. If the picture
were artistic, then one would expect that it be worth more money than a Polaroid taken haphazardly.
It would be inferred from the disproportionate price that its value was not just based on the quality of
the picture but rather on its intended use.
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First, because of the addition of element (2), a showing of any one
of the six alternatives in the revised Dost test would necessarily meet the
Miller standard for obscenity. Miller requires the prosecutor to show
"that the work in question, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest, is patently offensive in light of community standards, and lacks
serious literary, artistic, or scientific value."' 169 In the past, the Court has
held that statutes were unconstitutional because they ensnared material
that did not necessarily appeal to the prurient interest. 170 In contrast, the
revised Dost test would satisfy Miller. Before any defendant could be
charged and tried under this particular statute, the prosecutor would be
required to prove, and a fact-finder required to determine, that the Miller
standard for obscenity was met. Because element (2) embraces Miller,
this revised Dost test should succeed where the CPPA failed.
Second, the revised Dost test is consistent with the Ferber rationale
that the CPPA also violated. In evaluating the CPPA, the Supreme Court
was reticent to extend the definition of child pornography to virtual child
pornography because no real child was being exploited in its produc-
tion. 17 1 A material reason why child pornography is not protected speech
is because children are harmed in its creation. 72 Take away the harm,
the Court reasoned, and you take away the basis for restraining the right
to freedom of speech. 73 In contrast, this revised Dost test does not falter
on this point. While the CPPA captured images that did not feature chil-
dren, 174 the revised Dost test applies only to images of children. There-
fore, the revised Dost test is tailored to protect the population the Ferber
court was most concerned with protecting: children.
175
The images posted on McClellan's and other similar websites are
harming real children because real-not virtual-children, unknowingly
photographed, are turning up on the Internet. 76 Therefore, the concern
regarding the exploitation of real children remains an issue. The Court's
reason for classifying child pornography as unprotected speech is that it
169. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 235 (2002).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 236.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
176. Shaffer & Springer, supra note 32; see also, e.g., Dave Ickes, Barack Obama Threatens
Legal Action with Online Pedophile, ASSOC. CONTENT, Mar. 4, 2007, http://www.associatedcontent.
com/article/167538/barackobamathreatens legal action.html; Lara Jakes Jordan, International
Child Porn Ring Uncovered, ABC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
wireStory?id=4387119; Matt Null, Porn Sites Post Pics of Prep Polo Players, N. COUNTY TIMES
(Escondido, Cal.), Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/01/23/news/topstories/
1_01 531 22 08.txt.
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harms the "physiological, emotional, and mental health of children," and
"regulation is permissible... when targeted at the evils of the production
process itself, and not the effect of the material on its eventual
viewers."' 177 Banning the images on McClellan's and other similar web-
sites follows this rationale. By regulating these pictures, Congress could
effectively target the evils of the production process. Although the
children who appeared on McClellan's website were not sexually
assaulted or coerced into sexual activity, harm to the children photo-
graphed still remains. The images are harmful because they exploit chil-
dren by casting them in a light suggesting that they are available to pe-
dophiles. The permanent nature of photographs, and their availability
through archived websites like McClellan's, 7 8 creates a record of this
exploitation. Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine that any of these
children would have felt violated, much less vulnerable to attack.
Because a real child is being harmed, the Ferber standard is met.
This revised Dost test also answers a concern addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit--overbreadth. 179 The Eleventh Circuit suggested that
any definition of child pornography must be narrowly tailored in order to
avoid trapping family or friends who might be trading innocent
pictures. 18° The court suggested that a statute should require specific
intent on the part of the poster; without such intent, a computer-savvy
grandparent sharing innocent pictures of grandchildren through an email
entitled "Good pics of kids in bed" might be deemed to be distributing
pornographic material. Because the revised Dost test requires a scruti-
nized determination of intent when attacking images that appear
otherwise innocuous, the Eleventh Circuit's concerns are answered, and
computer-savvy grandparents are protected.
Regardless of what the picture or image looks like, the reasons
behind the prohibition of child pornography are the same across the
board. Child pornography is illegal because it sexually exploits chil-
dren. 18 Just because a picture does not contain sexually explicit imagery
in the traditional sense does not mean its harm on the photographed child
is negligible. Because "a democratic society rests, for its continuance,
upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity
177. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1300 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (quoting Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. at 253).
178. See discussion supra note 1.
179. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1306-07. However, in United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830
(2008), the Supreme Court overruled much of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the PROTECT Act.
Id. at 1834.
180. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1306-07.
181. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
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as citizens,"' 82 we must protect the youth of this nation. If, in protecting
the youth, freedom of speech is curtailed to exclude photographs of chil-
dren that are used for sexual gratification, so be it. After all, legislation
has been sustained by the courts in the past aimed at "protecting the
physical and emotional well-being of youth[,] even when the [legislation
has] operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.'
' 83
V. CONCLUSION
In the summer of 2007, Jack McClellan left California for Portland,
Oregon.184 McClellan claimed he had to leave California because, after
the restraining order and the injunction were issued, he was unable
to live under the state's "Orwellian protocol.' 85 Soon after the move,
McClellan created another website and was again looking for young girls
by visiting Portland's Polish Festival and the Oregon State Fair,
and posting the results on his updated website. 86 However, McClellan
vowed to one day return to California.'
87
At the time of this publication, it appears that McClellan will not be
returning to California anytime soon. In mid-January 2009, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals upheld the restraining order and the injunction
issued against McClellan in the summer of 2007.188 McClellan offered
two arguments for lifting the restraining order and the injunction. 89
First, McClellan argued that the injunction was improper because it was
based on the content of his speech. 90 Second, McClellan challenged the
injunction on the grounds that it amounted to prior restraint on his First
Amendment rights.' 91 The court, however, disagreed with both argu-
ments, stating that McClellan was missing the point.
192
To the court, McClellan's activities fell outside the bounds of
his constitutionally protected rights. 193  The court explained that
McClellan is not "prohibited from espousing his controversial views,"'
' 94
182. Id. at 757 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
183. Id.
184. KOMO Staff& News Servs., supra note 9.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Jim Holt, Pedophile Jack McClellan Loses Appeal, SIGNAL (Santa Clarita Valley, Cal.),
Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.the-signal.com/news/article/8142/.
188. Roe v. McClellan, No. B203651, 2009 WL 94014, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2009).
189. Id. at *4.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *6.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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nor is he barred from sharing his beliefs with likeminded individuals. 195
Rather, "he is prohibited from his continuing course of conduct to harass,
attack, assault, stalk, and keep under surveillance minor children., 196 In
issuing its decision, the court was explicit in delineating McClellan's
constitutional rights, noting that "[t]he voyeur and stalking nature of
McClellan's activities, and his attendance at functions where children
congregate, in conjunction with his use of photographs of small children
is offensive, frightening, menacing, and not protected by McClellan's
free speech or assembly rights."' 197
Although this decision shows the effectiveness of injunctive relief,
it does not go far enough. Concerned citizens and parents should not be
left to self-help remedies when faced with websites like McClellan's.
State legislatures and Congress can adopt measures aimed at curbing
these websites. After all, children and families need not be on the front
lines of this legal issue when state and federal representatives have the
tools to take action.
First Amendment protection and the prohibition of child exploita-
tion need not be at odds. With both state legislatures adopting the SSA
and Congress expanding the definition of "sexually explicit conduct" in
the PROTECT Act, these ideals can complement each another. At the
state level, prosecutors and parents will have the tools to combat website
publishers, whose intended purpose is to help facilitate crimes against
children. While prosecutors will have the ability to charge these publish-
ers with a crime and, in effect, limit the content on these websites,
parents will have the ability to seek injunctive relief. This battle can also
be fought on a second front. By expanding the definition of sexually
explicit conduct, Congress can capture and regulate innocuous yet sexu-
ally gratifying pictures. When expanding the definition, Congress must
be cognizant of constitutional considerations. It is possible to meet these
considerations by requiring that these innocuous images also be deemed
obscene. These two solutions can withstand constitutional scrutiny and
successfully regulate exploitative websites that place children in their
crosshairs. After all, "the Constitution [may be] the fabric of our nation,
but our children are the heart and soul.' 198
195. Id. at *7.
196. Id. at *6.
197. Id.
198. Barrett & Correa, supra note 2.
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